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The most enduring anthropological puzzle regarding 
initiation ceremonies is how to account for the notion 
that a mere social occasion — however ritualised and 
exotic —  may be deemed to transform people in such a tho-
roughgoing manner that they may become « new persons ». 
How might we account for the putative power of these cere-
monies to transform those who undergo them ? Residing in 
the tension between the way the analyst might expect things 
to be and the way they are elsewhere or for others, the ques-
tion begs a further one, as to how to account for alterity 
more generally. The idea of initiatory transformation, after 
all, is no more or less « surprising » than other classics of 
anthropological debate, such as the appeal of witchcraft, 
oracles and magic, the obligation to return gifts, or the 
advisability of cross-cousin marriage. Faced with cleavages 
of this kind, between our own default assumptions (that 
initiations don’t really metamorphose neophytes in the way 
participants suppose, that witchcraft doesn’t really work, 
etc.) and the phenomena as we find them ethnographically, 
there are two available strategies. One is to predicate our 
sense of bizarreness on to the phenomena themselves, and 
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then deem it our job to account causally for how such sur-
prising phenomena may come about. Thus for Houseman 
& Severi, for example, the task of making sense of initiation 
ceremonies is spelt out as that of accounting « for the parti-
cular mechanisms whereby the various participants become 
committed to the irreversible metamorphosis these ritual 
experiences are held to enact1 ».
This approach is common to most influential accounts 
of initiation. We may take just three examples. Turner’s 
famous idea that Van Gennep’s « liminal » stage of ritual 
is characterised by the negation of social differentiation 
(anti-structure) in favour of a more holistic « communitas » 
that « revitalises » social bonds, is most comfortably taken 
as an account of the efficacy of initiation rituals in terms 
of their social function2. Bloch’s early idea that the forma-
lised character of ritual expression in Merina circumcision 
ceremonies serves to establish the authority of the elders, 
is essentially an argument about the causal conditions for 
the birth of ideology and its false constructs3. And, to take 
but one more recent example, Whitehouse’s suggestion that 
ceremonial violence during initiation is a means of enco-
ding the symbolic content of the ritual in the neophytes » 
episodic memory, amounts to an argument regarding the 
cognitive conditions for the transmission of ritual cosmo-
logies4.
Perhaps there is nothing disreputable about causal 
explanations in anthropology. But there are perils when 
they are used to account for « alterity ». For the key assump-
tion that allows causal accounts of « strange » phenomena to 
get off the ground at all is that the phenomena in question 
are well understood. Having branded the task of analysis as 
that of explaining their occurrence as effects of this or other 
process, the task of understanding phenomena like initia-
tion is assumed to be a relatively straightforward matter 
of ethnographic description. Alterity, then, comes down 
to no more than a disagreement (e.g. they think initiation 
makes people new, we don’t). But liberal as it may sound, 
the danger with this view is that alterity is pasted over by 
way of misunderstanding5. For there is always the possibility 
1 Houseman & Severi, 
1998 : 278 ; 
Houseman, 2004.
2 Turner, 1969.
3 Bloch, 1974, 1992.
4 Whitehouse, 1996, 
2000.
5 Latour, 2002.
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— a strong one — that our surprise at things like initiation 
has something to do with our difficulty in understanding 
them in the first place. And, assuming that description is 
not equivalent to understanding (you could probably des-
cribe the mutterings of a schizophrenic, but that wouldn’t 
mean you’d understood them), this would imply that there 
is something more to the anthropological analysis of surpri-
sing data than a causal account of their occurrence.
A second anthropological strategy in the face of alte-
rity, then, would be to theorise misunderstandings rather 
than differences of opinion. On this view causal questions 
become irrelevant — even dangerous — inasmuch as they 
seek to provide antecedents to misunderstood effects. 
Rather, the job of analysis becomes that of clearing up the 
misunderstandings, and this project must be modelled not 
on science (which causalists worry about endlessly) but on 
philosophy, or at least that part of philosophy that takes 
conceptual analysis as its method6. After all, if alterity is an 
index of the inadequacy of the analyst’s assumptions, then 
the way to deal with it anthropologically must be to explore 
how those assumptions might be changed. Anthropological 
analysis, then, becomes a search for concepts that may be 
adequate to make sense of alien and therefore surprising 
data.
This paper accounts for initiation from within this 
analytic space. The task is to make sense of initiatory trans-
formation with reference to Ifá, the Afro-Cuban male cult 
that I have been studying in inner city Havana since 1998. 
The central thesis will be that the transformations that Ifá 
initiation effects need to be understood as ontological ones, 
in the sense that through them neophytes are redefined as 
different persons. This difference is articulated as an orga-
nised transformation of the neophyte’s relationships with 
deities as well as with fellow practitioners. This constitu-
tes an ontological redefinition because the relationships 
effected are, as philosophers put it, « internal » rather than 
« external », i.e. they do not merely reposition the neophyte 
vis-à-vis others, but rather they constitute part of his defini-
tion as a person.
6 Viveiros de Castro, 
2003 ; Holbraad, 2003.
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In order to establish this analytically an indirect stra-
tegy is adopted which, instead of examining the transfor-
med relations directly, focuses on the role of divination in 
bringing them about. This is both ethnographically feasible 
and analytically advantageous. It is feasible because divina-
tion has pride of place at the very core of Cuban Ifá initia-
tion ceremonies, and is the key mechanism that determines 
neophytes’ initiatory course, and hence the relational trans-
formations that this course implies. The focus on divina-
tion is also advantageous because, unlike the cult relations 
themselves, the diviners’ pronouncements offer a degree 
of transparency when it comes to deciding analytically on 
the matter of internal versus external relations. As it will 
be argued, these pronouncements are best understood as 
speech-acts that « redefine » the neophyte by relating him 
to meaningful entities in a way that reconstitutes him as a 
person (and hence the relations established are internal par 
excellence). As we shall see, the key notion of « inventive defi-
nition » has a number of surprising corollaries regarding the 
analysis of transformation itself. The brunt of the argument 
will be that these corollaries, which collectively comprise 
what I call a « motile » logic, provide an analytical bridge, 
so to speak, across which internal relations transmute from 
divination to the initiation ceremonies themselves.
Before proceeding, and in view of this journal’s African 
remit, we may comment on questions of comparison. As an 
attempt to elucidate the logic of initiation in Cuban Ifá, my 
account is unapologetically parochial. Unlike causal expla-
nations, which draw strength from universality (or perhaps 
« cross-cultural application »), the value of the philo-
philosophical analysis here on offer is gauged only in rela-
tion to the material it purports to illuminate — a matter of 
one’s ability to transform concepts to fit an ethnographic 
description, rather than extending them to cover many7. 
Thus, for example, although in some ways Ifá initiation in 
Cuba is similar to Yoruba practices, ethnographers of Ifá 
and other related cults in West Africa have not emphasised 7 Holbraad, 2007.
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the role of divination in cult recruitment, having tended to 
present cult initiation largely as a matter of family tradition 
or even personal choice8 Since the relationship between 
initiation and divination is key to my analysis, the present 
argument about the ontological character of initiation in 
Cuban Ifá cannot pretend to « apply » also to Yoruba cases.
Still, an orientation toward concept production makes 
virtue of this. The possibility that concepts produced to 
account for the Cuban case might not « fit » in West Africa 
presents an opportunity to transform concepts further. So, 
for example, to the extent that initiatory transformation 
presents as much of an analytical problem in West Africa 
as it does in Cuba, one may test the limits of a Cuban-
derived « motile logic », which renders initiatory rela-
tionships « internal » and therefore effective in an ontologi-
cal sense, against the West African ethnography. If, say, in 
Yoruba initiation heredity sometimes plays a role equivalent 
to divination in Cuba, then what equivalent or alternative 
to motility (derived from Cuban divination) might one 
derive from the field of West African heredity ? While such 
questions are not pursued here, they may be suggested by 
the ethnographic juxtapositions of this volume.
Ifá initiation as accumulation of relationships
Ifá in Cuba is very closely related to Santería, the 
most well known Afro-Cuban religious tradition. Both have 
evolved on the basis of elements brought to Cuba primarily 
by Yoruba speaking slaves from West Africa, mostly during 
the 19th century9.The relationship between the two is 
most obvious in the fact that they share an extremely rich 
mythical and devotional universe, but they are also related 
ritually, since babalawos (i.e. full initiates of Ifá) are often 
required to officiate as diviners in Santería rituals. The pres-
tige of the babalawos as diviners stems from the fact that, 
unlike santeros, they are initiated into the cult of Orula, 
short for Orunmila, the Yoruba god of divination, whom 
8 Bascom, 1991 : 84-
85 ; Akinnaso, 1992. 
Nevertheless, I suspect 
that oracles may have 
been (or still are) more 
important in regulating 
matters of  initiation 
among the Yoruba 
than has hitherto 
been discussed to my 
knowledge. Such hints 
do at least exist in 
the literature (e.g. for 
a discussion of  oracles’ 
role in individuals’ 
devotion to particular 
deities, cf. Bascom, 
1969 : 77-78), and, 
in view of  Abimbola’s 
account of  the pervasive 
use of  divination in 
Yoruba Ifa (1997), 
it would be surprising 
if  this did not extend 
also to matters of  cult 
recruitment.
9 Henceforth when 
I write of  « Ifá » 
I mean Cuban Ifá. In 
spelling ritual terms of  
Yoruba origin 
I follow Cuban rather 
than contemporary 
Yoruba conventions ; 
or better, I follow a 
Cuban convention, since 
among practitioners 
spellings have not been 
formulated consistently. 
For example, Cubans 
often distinguish 
« heavy » consonants of  
Yoruba-derived terms 
by spelling them either 
quasi-phonetically 
(e.g.Yoruba-derived od 
as in ordu) or by double 
consonants (e.g.oddu). 




they have the privilege to adore. Indeed, the prestige of the 
babalawos is rather enhanced in the Cuban context by the 
macho credentials conferred upon them by the fact that only 
heterosexual men are admitted into the cult. Nevertheless, 
throughout its history in Cuba and up until today, Ifá has 
largely been practised by « marginal » groups, as Cuban 
intellectuals often say, in predominantly non-white urban 
neighbourhoods.
The starting point for understanding the structure 
of Ifá worship is that participation depends on initiation. 
While non-initiates (aleyos) may participate in some of 
the rituals that comprise worship, they are barred from 
dispensing them for two main reasons. Firstly, Ifá worship 
is deemed effective only insofar as it involves the use of a 
number of consecrated entities, and these are only bestowed 
on initiates. Secondly, the knowledge of how to dispense 
the various rituals is strictly esoteric. Initiates’ commitment 
to secrecy is captured by the very term babalawo, translated 
as « father of secrets » : baba = father, awo = secret10.
A simple initiate/non-initiate distinction, however, 
does not capture the complexity of relations between practi-
tioners since, on the one hand, Ifá initiation itself admits of 
various grades, and, on the other, practitioners who wish to 
enter Ifá must previously be initiated to Santería, and may 
also be initiated into other Afro-Cuban cults (for example 
the Bantu-speaking based Palo Monte complex). These two 
features complicate matters considerably, so it is worth out-
lining the possible stages in the career of an Ifá initiate in 
some detail.
Table 1 depicts initiation as a gradual process that 
unfolds as a series of ceremonies over time. Ceremonies 
that are considered absolute pre-requisites for Ifá initiation 
appear in the central two columns of the table. Other cere-
monies, which may emerge in any individual case as addi-
tional prerequisites if the oracle so ordains, are listed in the 
far left and far right columns.
10 Menéndes, 1995 : 
51 ; Akinnaso, 1992 : 
92.
 Relationships in motion 225
Ceremonies dispensed within ifá cult (by babalawos)
Ceremonies dispensed outside ifá cult (by 
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Table 1 - Ceremonies undertaken on initiatory « path » of Ifá
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11 For a detailed discus-
sion of  the historical 
evolution of  this 
ceremonial sequence in 
Cuba cf. Brown, 2003.
12 The « warriors » 
include Elegguá 
(messenger god 
and « owner of  the 
paths »), Ogún (patron 
of  smithery and war), 
and Ochosi (god of  
hunting), who are given 
together with Osun, 
considered a symbol of  
the neophyte’s personal 
well being.
Not all the ceremonies listed here are properly consi-
dered as initiations. « Initiation » (iniciación), a term used 
by practitioners themselves, refers to the more ceremonious 
rites — such as the receipt of « mano de Orula », as well as 
full Santería or Ifá initiation11 —, which involve lengthy 
divinations that regulate various aspects of the neophyte’s 
further progress within the cult, as we shall see. Other cere-
monies are best described as consecration rites, whereby the 
neophyte « receives » various consecrated paraphernalia for 
his or her personal protection (e.g. receipt of the so-called 
« guerreros » — the popular « warrior » deities12). Indeed, 
while each step of initiation or consecration opens up for 
practitioners a correspondingly wider range of ritual acti-
vities, the crucial leap from participation to dispensation 
is only achieved by those « practitioners who ‘‘become’’ or 
‘‘make’’ Ifá » (hacerse Ifá), i.e. those who achieve the status of 
babalawos by undergoing the weeklong initiation ceremony. 
Only babalawos are entitled to dispense Ifá rituals, be they 
of divination, magic, or consecration.
Nonetheless, seen from the viewpoint of their social 
implications, all stages of consecration have an initiatory 
character. From the first step of consecration practitioners 
are incorporated in networks of religious kinship, referred 
to as « families » (familia en la religión, familia de Ifá), which 
from then on provide a primary context for worship. As 
shown on figure 1, at the heart of Ifá kinship lies the rela-
tionship between a padrino (godfather) and his ahijado/a 
(godson/daughter). This relationship arises because conse-
cration always involves « receiving » (recibir) the crucial con-
secrated items from an initiator who « has » (tener) them and 
is able to act as godfather by « giving » (dar) them, usually in 
return for money. Once completed, this ritual transaction 
engenders a lasting relationship that is cultivated in hierar-
chical terms : the godchild owes his or her padrino respect 
and is expected to visit him regularly, bringing gifts when 
possible. The padrino, in turn, is obliged to help and advise 
his godchildren on matters religious, both by coaching 
them through mythical knowledge and ritual practice, and 
by making his ritual services (divination, magic, etc.) availa-
ble to them according to their circumstances.
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Figure 1 - Ritual kinship relations in « religious family »
While this vertical kinship relation (godfather to god-
child) is as simple as it is fundamental, it can engender a 
large degree of complexity due to the fact that godfathers 
can have many godchildren and vice versa. Babalawos have a 
free hand at attracting godchildren at quantity, and indeed 
tend to welcome as many as possible, since this is felt to 
enhance their personal prestige among practitioners, inclu-
ding considerable material accrual (money, gifts, etc.13). 
Conversely, a single practitioner may have different godfa-
thers corresponding to separate ceremonies. Furthermore, 
the ceremony of full Ifá initiation requires the ritual assis-
tance of a « second padrino » (usually referred to as ayibbón) 
who subsequently may take a primary role if the godfather-
godchild relationship is disrupted for some reason (the 
godfather’s death or immigration, personal conflict, etc.). 
Finally, complexity accrues also on the horizontal dimen-
sion, since godchildren who share a godfather are viewed as 
siblings, and refer to each other as abbure, or, in Spanish, as 
« brothers/sisters in the religion » (hermanos en la religión).
Still, of all ego’s ritual kin-relations by far the most 
important is with the godfather, not only because of its 
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14 Brown, 2003.
15 Menéndez Vázquez, 
1995.
substantive ritual significance, but also because of its struc-
tural implications. Unlike other relations within the ritual 
« family », godfather-godchild relations can be iterated indefi-
nitely through the generations, as godchildren who become 
fully initiated babalawos gain the right to acquire godchildren 
of their own, and so on. Referred to as ramas (branches), 
lineages of babalawos may in principle extend indefinitely 
into the past, although, since Ifá has a relatively short history 
in Cuba, babalawos will typically trace their genealogical line 
from three to maybe six or seven generations back, often to 
an « African » of the 19th century14.
The genealogical reckoning involved in lineage affilia-
tions is extremely important to babalawos both ritually and 
politically. Ritually speaking, the lineage is considered sacred 
in its own right, and its efficacy is invoked at the outset of 
all rites by means of a ceremonious incantation of ancestors’ 
names — the so-called « moyubba15 ». Babalawos explain this 
sacred quality of lineages in terms of the ritual of initiation 
itself : the Orula idol-deities that godfathers « give » during 
initiation are said to be « born » (nacen) out of their own 
Orula. Moreover, the consecration of the neophytes themsel-
ves as babalawos is also spoken of as a birth, and specifically 
as « the birth of a king », as babalawos like to emphasise. 
Lineages of babalawos, then, are coupled with isomorphic 
lineages of Orula idol-deities, as illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2 - Ritual lineages and the « births » of Orula idol-deities
Babalawos    Orula idol-deities 
          
      godfather to         « gives birth » to 
             
 Relationships in motion 229
16 Bascom, 1941 ; 
Holbraad, 2007.
In summary, Ifá initiation is articulated as a gradual 
transformation of relationships on two planes. On the one 
hand neophytes enter increasingly wide circles of divine 
influence by receiving various kinds of consecrated items, 
including the Orulas themselves. My unwieldy term « idol-
deity » is significant here inasmuch as practitioners make 
clear that, once consecrated, these objects are deities — in 
other words they are not to be glossed as « representations » 
of deities16. 
In fact what distinguishes the initiated from the 
uninitiated in this context is precisely the fact that while 
both groups are in principle subject to divine influence, 
the former are better equipped to enter into reciprocal 
relationships with the deities, by virtue of the care and 
attention they bestow on the idol-deities they have received 
during their initiation. Each deity has likes and dislikes in 
terms of the position they should occupy in the initiate’s 
home, offerings they should be given and, above all, the 
animals’ blood with which he or she ought to be fed. Over 
and above the regular care that they owe their deities, initia-
tes may also appeal to them on specific matters by making 
occasional requests. These are accompanied by appropriate 
offerings, which may be decided through divination, and 
are often spoken or whispered directly at them.
As we saw, however, such human-deity relationships 
are connected to a second plane of relationships, namely 
ritual kin-ties between humans — be they immediate, in the 
« family », or mediated along the lineage. Significantly for 
the present argument, such human-human relations are 
a logical consequence of human deity relations. So, for 
example, in the « coupled » constitution of lineages outli-
ned above (figure 2), it is by virtue of « having » their own 
Orula that godfathers are able to preside over the « birth » 
of a new Orula, which subsequently the neophyte « recei-
ves » as a prerequisite for his own « birth » as a babalawo (see 
figure 3 next page).
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Figure 3 - The logical priority of initiate : deity relationships over 
initiate : initiate relationships
The same priority holds for ritual « family » ties (as 
opposed to lineages). For example, you might be my sibling 
(abbure) because we both received our Warrior deities, say, 
from the same babalawo, who in turn was only in position 
to give the Warriors to us because he had his own. And 
note that the logical implication here is not mutual. With 
respect to this (and each) ceremony, the babalawo does not 
give us the deities by virtue of being our godfather, but 
rather becomes our godfather by virtue of giving us the 
deities. Renovating Van Gennep’s famous thesis about the 
sacred character of social transitions, we may say that in Ifá 
relationships between people are both mediated and engen-
dered by relationships with deities17.
Internal versus external relations
We have so far characterised Ifá initiation as an unfol-
ding accumulation of neophytes’ relationships with deities 
on the one hand and fellow participants on the other. In 
adopting « relationship » as a guiding concept to describe 
the transformations neophytes undergo I follow Severi and 
Houseman, who place relational transformation at the core 
of the very definition of all ritual18. In line with my intro-
ductory comments, however, I shall not follow Severi and 
Houseman in using relations to explain practitioners’ com-
mitment to initiatory transformation. Rather the present 
argument is limited to using the concept of relationship to 
characterise this transformation. The question is this : inso-
17 Van Gennep, 1960.
18 Houseman & Severi, 




« had » by
« given » to 
« gives birth » to
babalawos
Orulas
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far as practitioners are committed to the transformation 
initiation is supposed to engender ; and if this transfor-
mation can be described as an organised accumulation of 
relationships ; how, then, is the practitioners’ commitment 
to transformation best conceptualised ? What could the 
idea that initiation induces relational alterations mean to 
us as analysts ?
The question is reasonable when one considers that in 
a very ordinary sense relational transformations just are the 
fabric of social living. One would be hard pressed to think 
of any social occasion that did not involve a transformation 
of relationships (just think of the way your day has panned 
out so far today, and the multitude of relationships that 
have altered during its course, including ours as you read 
these words…). In fact one could probably argue that to call 
an occasion « social » merely indicates that it pertains to 
« relationships ». The present paper follows a recent trend 
of self-conscious attempts to provide this truism with a con-
tent, setting up the notion of the « relation » as an object 
rather than just a premise of analytical scrutiny19. In par-
ticular, I argue, in order properly to characterise initiatory 
transformation in terms of altered relationships in a way 
that does not just conflate it, bluntly, with all other social 
occasions (catching the bus, reading an academic paper, 
etc.), one would need an analytic distinction between dif-
ferent kinds of relational change.This is the kind of topic 
that has preoccupied philosophers at least since Aristotle, 
who parsed change itself as an alteration of the relations 
that hold between a subject and its predicates, a proble-
matic pair of ideas to which I shall return. For now, it is 
expedient to draw attention to one particular philosophical 
distinction that arguably goes to the heart of the matter of 
initiation, between so-called « internal » and « external » 
relations20. An entity is « internally » related to another if 
this relationship is part of its definition. If the entity can 
be defined independently of its relationship to the other, 
the two entities are related « externally ». Series, systems, 
part-whole relations, and essential properties are often 
cited as instances of internal relation. E.g. the members of 
19 Strathern, 1992, 
2005 ; Latour, 2005 ; 
Law, 2004 ; Viveiros de 
Castro, 2002.
20 Moore, 1922 ; 
Ollman, 1975.
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the natural number series (1, 2, 3…) are defined in terms of 
their relations to the rest ; kinship terms constitute systems 
of mutual definition (« mother » in terms of « children », 
etc.) ; sentences are defined by their having words as their 
parts ; and Socrates was defined by his humanity, just as 
humans were defined by their mortality. By contrast, my 
relationship, say, to my shirt is an example of an external 
relation : my definition does not, presumably, depend on 
wearing this (or any) shirt.
Might the distinction between internal and external 
relations serve to sharpen our characterisation of initiation, 
so as to understand its difference from catching the bus and 
such ? The criterion would be this : are the relationships that 
neophytes amass as a result of successive grades of initia-
tion constitutive of their definition as persons ? In such a 
case we could qualify these relationships philosophically as 
« internal », thus distinguishing them from relationships 
engendered in a bus queue, say, which are clearly external.
Of course, my intention to argue that initiatory rela-
tionships are indeed internal, that they define initiates as 
persons, is transparent. However, ascertaining this analyti-
cally is not as easy as it may seem. No doubt, initiates do 
seem to indicate in a number of ways that they consider 
that initiation into Ifá has made them different people, as 
they also would express it21. A very common conception, 
for example, is that Ifá initiation « gives you health and 
development » and, more specifically, that it prolongs one’s 
life by sixteen years22. It is also said that every grade of ini-
tiation « gives » the neophyte aché, a mana-type concept-cum-
substance, which in this context could be translated as 
potency, ritual as well as personal23. Most obviously perhaps, 
we have seen that babalawos do talk of full initiation to Ifá 
as the « birth of a King ». Nevertheless, babalawos tend to 
make such comments in a loose way. At any rate, one may 
be sceptical about using informants’ statements as replies 
to analytical questions, particularly when these questions 
cannot be addressed to them in a way that is not leading 
(« Do you think Ifá has changed your essence as a person ? » 
is not a particularly good interview question !).
21 Cf. Wedel, 2004 : 
100-105 for santería 
initiation, and Goldman, 
1985 for a remark-
able analysis of  the 
ritual constitution of  
personhood in Brazilian 
candomblé. 
22 The number 16 reigns 
supreme in Ifá divina-
tion, since the system 
of  binary configurations 
on which it is based 
yields sixteen principal 
combinations, the so-
called signos or oddu 
(see below). 
As illustrated by 
the majestic numero-
logical speculations 
of  the Cuban mystical 
scholar Heres Hevia, 
16 does indeed have 
metaphysical potential 
(Heres Hevia, 1962). 
Considered as the first 
iteration of  squaring 
on the nutural number 
series (2, 4, 16…), one 
might say that 16 is 
the mystical number 
par excellence in that it 
tends most economi-
cally to render the 
discrete Many as a 
Continuum One 
– 16 exemplifies 
circularity in number, so 
to speak, and is in this 
sense « magical ». 
23 Holbraad, 2007 ; 
Cabrera, 2000 : 99, 
103.
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I want to argue that the case for viewing initiatory 
relationships as philosophically internal can be made if 
one turns away from the relationships themselves, to look 
instead at the way they are comprehensively regulated by 
means of divination. For this it pays to examine the crucial 
role of divination in the process of Ifá initiation.
Initiation and oracles that define
Divination is at the core of Ifá initiation in two impor-
tant ways. Firstly, lengthy divinatory seances (called itá) are 
arguably the centrepiece of all the major ceremonies on 
the ladder of Ifá initiation, including the ceremony of full 
initiation as a babalawo. Secondly, each ceremony on the 
ladder of Ifá initiation can only be carried out following a 
prior oracular prescription, so that initiation is essentially 
premised on divination. In this section the first point is consi-
dered, arguing that the divinations carried out during initia-
tion ceremonies transform neophytes by redefining them as 
new persons. In the following section the consequences of 
this are explored in view of the second point, regarding the 
divinatory premise of initiation. The overall aim will be to 
show that since the cult relationships that initiation implies 
are premised on divination, and divination is a process of 
redefinition, the cult relationships are also best thought of 
as defining the neophytes involved, which is just another 
way of saying that these relationships are internal. Before 
getting to these analytical tasks, however, we may give an 
idea of how Ifá divination works.
In Ifá the consecrated paraphernalia associated with 
Orula are used to make the deity « speak », as it is said. 
Orula consists of a clay or porcelain pot containing a 
number of consecrated palm nuts. Practitioners emphasise 
that, along with a consecrated stone (otá) also held in the 
pot, these nuts « are » Orula. Divination involves a series 
of techniques that yield one out of 256 possible configura-
tions of the palm nuts. The babalawo achieves this by casting 
16 nuts 8 consecutive times in a manner that is equivalent 
to tossing a coin 8 times (hence the total of 256 possibili-
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ties). The resulting configurations are referred to either in 
Yoruba as oddu, or in Spanish as signos (signs) or letras (letters 
or verses). While practitioners explain that the oddu are a 
means by which Orula speaks, they also emphasise that each 
oddu is a divine being in its own right, sometimes thought 
of as a guise or avatar of Orula — what practitioners refer 
to as the deity’s « paths » (caminos). Furthermore, each oddu 
has its own name, as well as its own graphic sign (hence the 
Spanish term signo).
Each oddu is associated with an open — though parti-
cular — set of characteristics, much like star-signs in Western 
astrology. These are described in an inordinate number of 
myths associated with each oddu, which are often referred 
to as « paths » (caminos del oddu), or « stories » (historias) 
— the ritual term is patakin (pl. patakines). Each oddu also 
corresponds to a number of specific aphorisms, character 
traits, advice, warnings about specific types of events, pro-
hibitions, and other rules of conduct, as well as assorted 
ritual and cosmological data. Dedicated babalawos spend 
a lifetime memorising and contemplating these data, and 
bring them to bear on the circumstances of consultants 
during séances24.
The most ceremonial séances that babalawos are called 
on to perform are those of itá, which are performed for the 
benefit of neophytes during initiation ceremonies. The 
main reason why itá ceremonies are considered so important 
— more so than the more everyday consultations (consultas) 
that babalawos perform for clients — is that the information 
imparted in them is understood to be relevant to the whole 
life (and death) of the neophyte25. In itá, following the initial 
designation of the neophyte’s oddu, which is marked early 
on in the seance on a divining tray covered with consecrated 
powder (iyefá or aché), the neophyte is coached on the various 
features associated with his oddu by the babalawos presiding 
over his initiation. Unlike ordinary consultations, more 
than one babalawo is needed to perform itá (usually a mini-
mum of four) because, as initiates explain, this ensures that 
as many aspects of the oddu as possible are covered.
24 See Holbraad, 2003. 
To compare with Yoruba 
cases see Abimbola, 
1997 ; Akinnaso, 1992 ; 
Barber, 1991.
25 The permanence 
of  one’s « sign of  itá » 
(signo de itá) is most 
clearly manifested 
by the fact that, after 
having been determined 
in the itá ceremony, 
this sign becomes the 
name by which the 
initiate is referred to in 
subsequent rituals. This 
is particularly so in full 
Ifá initiation, since, both 
in formal ritual and in 
more informal contexts, 
babalawos will refer 
to each other by their 
signo, often dispensing 
with Christian names 
altogether.
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The initiators’ coaching typically takes the following 
form. First, with magisterial and sometimes competitive 
machismo, the presiding babalawos give a rather fragmen-
ted account of what they take to be the salient features of 
the oddu. « Ifá says you are a leader, your sign is the highest 
ranking of all », « this sign is about problems in the home », 
or « this is a strong sign, it means death is after you » are 
statements one might typically hear in this initial phase of 
coaching. These are usually explained or elaborated upon 
for the neophyte’s benefit with reference to the corpus 
of myths associated with the oddu. This process can take 
considerable time, as babalawos show off their rhetorical 
talents, and involves narratives such as the following, which 
was recounted during the itá of a friend of mine, in order 
to explain the aforementioned warning about domestic 
problems :
Once tiger visited the goat, asking him if he could sleep on 
his patio. Goat agreed, so the next day tiger asked him if he could 
sleep in the living room. Again the goat let him, so the next day 
tiger asked if it would be all right to sleep in the bedroom. Goat 
went to consult Orula to find out what to do. Orula told the goat 
that tiger was planning to eat him, and advised : « put some specs 
of corn in one hand and stones in the other ». So the goat took 
tiger for a walk and, on the way, started eating the corn. The tiger 
asked, « what are you eating ? », and the goat showed him the 
stones. Tiger got scared and fled.
Following the lengthy process of mythical story telling 
and discussion, each of the babalawos takes turns to give 
the neophyte instructions of various types, with reference 
to the characteristics of his signo. Significantly, these pro-
nouncements result from what we might call a process of 
customisation. Since the various elements that enter divi-
natory pronouncements (regarding death, domestic affairs, 
and so on) are initially associated generically with each oddu, 
the diviner’s job is to render this data personally relevant 
the neophyte who « drew » the oddu in question (sacar el 
oddu). That this can require considerable skill is shown 
by the above example of mythical interpretation. Nothing 
in the myth of the obtrusive tiger speaks directly to the 
consultant’s circumstances. In this case, it is the babalawo’s 
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awareness that in Cuba housing scarcity has put domestic 
problems at the forefront of people’s minds that allows him 
to « customise » the myth so as to render it relevant to the 
consultant.
This raises the question : is the diviners’ ability to 
relate the data of the oddu to the neophyte during the itá 
ceremony to be understood in terms of internal or external 
relations ? If it could be shown that internal relations are at 
stake here, then a big step would be made towards showing 
that other relational transformations that Ifá initiation 
effects are also internal (viz the cult relationships between 
neophytes and deities, and neophytes and ritual kin). This 
is because these relationships are also instigated by divina-
tion, as we shall see. However, the advantage of focusing 
attention on the relationships that diviners announce 
during the itá (e.g. « death is after you »), rather than the 
cult relationships that itá engenders, is that the former take 
the form of verbal affirmations. This is useful for purposes 
of our argument, considering that a definition — the ope-
rative concept that allows one to distinguish internal from 
external relations — is also a form of affirmation. Hence to 
broach the matter of internal relations we may consider the 
logical characteristics that may distinguish definitions from 
other types of affirmation, to see whether the oracular pro-
nouncements of itá fit the bill.
Although a survey of philosophical discussions of defini-
tion is beyond the scope of this paper as well as my expertise, 
it may be fair to say that the debate among analytical philoso-
phers of language in particular is concerned with questions 
of the adequacy of definitions26. Is it possible to capture the 
meaning of a word, a sentence, a concept, an entity, etc. 
(positions differ and proliferate in these debates !) in terms of 
other meanings, and what are the logical entailments of such 
a possibility or of its absence ? Such a concern with adequacy, 
implicated in an assortment of intertwining debates in con-
temporary philosophy of language, is hardly surprising consi-
dering that the requirement for good definitions (or adequate 
at least) has been deemed central to philosophical inquiry, 
from Socratic « what is… » questions onwards.
26 For a synthesis of  
the classical debates, 
cf. Robinson, 1950.
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Here, however, we may foreground a notion of defi-
nition that analytical philosophers tend to pass over, and 
which arguably captures what is at stake in Ifá divination. 
One could broach the problem by pointing to the conser-
vative, so to speak, character of analytical philosophers’ 
attention to adequacy. The assumption there seems to be 
that, when it comes to the problem of definition, the most 
interesting question is how meanings that already exist as 
a stock (albeit perhaps an uncharted one) may or may not 
relate to each other. Here is a horse, say, and the problem is 
to decide whether and how a sentence like « quadruped with 
a flowing main and tail » may serve to define it. Appeals to 
truth-conditions are prominent in these discussions. Since 
we have a sense of what a horse is, defining it must be a 
matter of getting this sense right, using terms that hold true 
of horses, such as « quadruped ». On this conservative view, 
then, definition must at the very minimum be a species of 
truth-claim, understood in the ordinary sense : a predica-
tive assertion of important facts about the definiendum27. 
Aristotelians would call these facts « essential ».
But what of inventive definitions ? It is remarkable 
that philosophers, who do nothing if not muster powers 
of clear thinking and creativity in order to change what and 
how we think should presume a stock of meanings that is 
given. Maybe defining a horse, or even virtue, is a matter 
of articulating a sense one already has, but who could even 
begin to have a sense of a Platonic Form, a monad, or 
sense data before philosophers ventured to define them ? 
Indeed, those philosophers who have followed Nietzsche in 
thinking of philosophy as an « untimely » enterprise, have 
sought reflectively — inventively — to theorise invention28. 
And so have anthropologists who see the creation of new 
meanings not just as a philosophical prerogative, but as an 
irreducible aspect of social living29.
Here we may venture one distinction between inven-
tive definitions and the ones analytical philosophy is 
mainly concerned with — let us call them « conventional », 
following Wagner30. The distinction pertains to the ques-
tion of truth. As already noted, conventional definitions 
27 I adopt the standard 




(e.g. Robinson, 1950). 
The former is the object 
of  definition, while 
the latter is its means.
28 Heidegger, 1968 ; 
Deleuze, 1994 ; 
Nietzsche, 1997.
29 Wagner, 1981 ; 
Ardener, 1989 ; 
Strathern, 1999 ; Latour, 




are a species of truth-claims : if « quadruped » serves as part 
of the definition of a horse, this is because the statement 
« horses are quadrupeds » is true. Now, as an example of 
what I take to be an inventive definition, consider a defi-
nition of inventive definition — as pudding to my proof, so 
to speak. Let us define inventive definition as a speech-act 
that inaugurates a new meaning by combining two or more 
previously unrelated meanings. I did it just now ! Taking the 
meanings « speech-act », « inauguration », « novelty », and 
« meaning », I combined them to inaugurate a new mea-
ning — new relative to convention —, which I call « inventive 
definition ». Now consider whether this kind of definition 
is a species of ordinary truth-claim. If it were, « speech-act », 
« inauguration », « novelty », and « meaning » would all have 
to be construed as properties that predicate « inventive defi-
nition », like « quadruped » and « flowing main » predicate 
« horse ». Our definition of « inventive definition » would 
be deemed adequate insofar as it picked out properties that 
hold true of such definitions (viz that they are speech-acts, 
they inaugurate, etc.). But this would be contradictory. 
The notion that definiens must pick out properties of their 
definiendum implies that the definiendum is not new : it must 
already be there to be picked at, acting as a reference by 
which its definition may be checked for truth. Posited as a 
condition for its own definition, the definiendum takes logi-
cal precedence over its definiens, and hence the latter cannot 
be said to inaugurate it. So, since inventive definitions are 
defined inventively as inaugurations — as inventions of (new) 
meanings —, it follows that, unlike conventional definitions, 
inventive definitions are not predicative truth-claims31.
I wish to argue that divinatory pronouncements are 
inventive definitions in just this sense. Consider two sta-
tements that babalawos frequently repeat, adage-like, when 
discussing the wonder of divination. « Ifá doesn’t make 
mistakes » (Ifá no se equivoca), they say, and « in Ifá there are 
no lies » (en Ifá no hay mentiras). Babalawos themselves may 
certainly lie or make mistakes, since they are « imperfect 
humans », as one practitioner put it, but not the oracle of 
Ifá. As I have argued elsewhere, these statements effectively 
31 It may be noted that 
in order to make this 
argument (identifying 
the predication of  
novel meanings as a 
« contradiction ») I have 
effectively convention-
alised the definition 
of  inventive definition. 
After all, a contradiction 
is just a joint statement 
of  truth and falsehood : 
if  it is true that inaugu-
rations of  meanings 
(viz inventive defini-
tions) are predicative 
truth-claims then 
it is false that they 
are inaugurations. 
« Inauguration » is thus 
treated as a predicate 
of  inventive definitions, 
in order to be treated 
truth-functionally for the 
sake of  the argument. 
This, however, does not 
show that inventive defi-
nitions are, willy-nilly, 
predicative truth-claims. 
Rather it demonstrates 
that, for purposes of  
logical argument — with 
its reliance on truth-
functional criteria such 
as contradiction —, 
the meanings that are 
brought together in 
inventive definition can 
be disaggregated as 
predicates and treated 
as conventions — 
moving, as Wagner 
would put it, from figure 
to ground (Wagner, 
1972 : 6-7, 1987). 
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bar the logical possibility that genuine oracular pronounce-
ments might be false at all32. Contrary to Evans-Pritchard’s 
famous suggestion that practitioners of divination shield 
themselves from oracular errors by means of « secondary 
elaborations » — further « mystical beliefs » that may account 
for the error33 —, for babalawos the very notion of « oracular 
error » is an oxymoron. If oracles don’t lie and don’t make 
mistakes then oracles that are wrong are not oracles34.
The most telling conversation I had during fieldwork 
on this matter was with a young babalawo about, as he 
called them, « exploitative » babalawos35. One of his main 
complaints was that some babalawos seek to impress their 
clients by attaching Orula’s verdicts to specific dates or 
people’s names (e.g. « your daughter will fall ill next 
Tuesday », or « the witch is your neighbour, Maria », etc.) :
I don’t give people dates : Ifá speaks past, present, and future, 
and gives advice, but [consultants] should know for themselves 
their own situation and act on it as they see fit. […] Some [baba-
lawos] do give them, but that’s just showing off, and clients com-
plain when things don’t turn out that way. How can they know 
these things ? [i.e. the babalawos] Ifá doesn’t work like that.
How are we to understand the claim that « Ifá doesn’t 
work like that » ? Why can Ifá « give advice » but not dates 
and names ? When I asked my informant to elaborate, he 
reverted to a point babalawos tend to repeat like a mantra 
in such conversations, namely that « Ifá is interpretation », 
implying that interpretation of itself could not yield speci-
fic names and dates. Admittedly, the implication is moot 
since Ifá is used, in certain contexts, to give unambiguous 
« yes » or « no » answers to specific questions posed to it 
by the diviner36. I would suggest rather that the import of 
babalawos’ normative insistence on such terms as « advice » 
(consejo) and « interpretation » (interpretación) has more to 
do with the question of falsifiability than with ambiguity. 
By adding dates and names, « exploitative » babalawos 
present Orula’s verdicts as statements of fact that may be 
verified or falsified according to how things actually turn 
out. « Advice », by contrast, may be « interpreted », or even 




34 This would be obvious 
if  one took the state-
ments that in Ifá there 
are no mistakes or lies 
as attempts to inven-
tively define what kind 
of  thing verdicts are, 
rather than as wide-eyed 
attempts to charac-
terise a miraculous 
feature of  the verdicts 
by assuming an analogy 
with ordinary (and 
fallible) truth-claims. 
But since, following 
Evans-Pritchard, 
existing accounts of  
divination do assume 
that divinatory verdicts 
are just a special case 
of  ordinary truth-
claims, it is necessary 
to press the case home 
(Bascom, 1941 ; Park, 
1963 ; Fortes, 1966 ; 
Turner, 1975 ; Sperber, 
1985 ; Zeitlyn, 1990, 
1995 ; Boyer, 1990, 
1994).
35 Holbraad, 2004.
36 Holbraad, 2003 : 52-
53 ; Werbner, 1973.
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that « Ifá speaks past, present and future » (Ifá habla pasado, 
presente y futuro), which babalawos often emphasise during 
divination, is another normative mitigation of falsifiability. 
When, in the itá for my own mano de Orula ceremony, 
I queried — in falsifying mood ! — the oracle’s contention 
that I am prone to impotence, one of the babalawos remin-
ded me with macho gusto that I have no children after all. 
« And don’t forget, » he added with emphasis, « Ifá speaks 
past, present, and future ».
Normativity is important here. For, like the state-
ment « your daughter will fall ill on Tuesday », an oracular 
verdict like « you are prone to impotence » could perfectly 
well be interpreted as truth-functional, and thus rendered 
falsifiable. But what if oracular pronouncements were to 
be interpreted in non-truth-functional terms as inventive 
definitions ? Babalawos’ insistent muddying of truth-functio-
nal waters through their normative commentaries suggests 
that such an alternative may be analytically appropriate. 
For my informant’s dispute with « exploitative » babalawos 
who give names and dates can be cast precisely as a dispute 
over whether oracular pronouncements ought to be taken 
as falsifiable truth-claims or not. Just like Evans-Pritchard, 
and other analysts of divination who have taken for granted 
that oracles deliver predicative truth-claims37, practitioners 
themselves are liable to make the same assumption — and 
this pitfall may be readily exploited by babalawos who wish 
to « show off ». No wonder, then, that babalawos should 
find it necessary to stress normatively that the oracles’ 
pronouncements are not affirmations that might, least of 
all in principle, be falsified. And if they, as practitioners, 
find such a category mistake perilous, then so should we as 
analysts38.
Let us then spell out the implications of treating divi-
natory pronouncements as inventive definitions. We noted 
earlier that diviners arrive at verdicts during the itá by esta-
blishing relations between neophytes and various features 
associated with the oddu (myths, injunctions, names, etc.). 
So, verdicts like « death is after you » or « you are prone 
37 See note 33 above.
38 Viveiros de Castro, 
2002 : 134.
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to impotence » established a relation between myself and 
death or impotence. Treating the verdicts as inventive defi-
nitions would imply that « death », « impotence » and the 
like are not predicates that « hold true » of me. Rather, they 
are meanings that are related to me so as to redefine me. By 
telling me that death is after me the oracle renders a specific 
relationship to death as part of my definition as a person, 
which is to say that my relationship to death is rendered 
internal.
In sum, rather than ascribing the consultant with a 
set of properties that may be falsified in light of experience, 
divination defines the consultant as a new kind of person. 
From being a person who stands in no particular relation 
to death, the oracle transforms me into a person death is 
after. To ask whether such a shift is « true » or « false » is 
fundamentally to misunderstand the ontological character 
of the transformation, by confusing it with the epistemolo-
gical question of how the shift may be ascertained. The fact 
that practitioners of Ifá might be as liable to fall into this 
trap as analysts have been explains why babalawos put such 
normative emphasis on the requirement that the oracles’ 
pronouncements be interpreted as non-falsifiable.
Now, this way of thinking of divination may seem 
awkward. Maybe a concept can be defined afresh, but can 
the notion of invention really be stretched to include people 
as well ? For, more than just a meaning (e.g. « inventive defi-
nition »), I am a flesh-and-blood person, and it is unclear 
how as such I can be « brought together » with meanings 
such as « death » (and if I were literally brought together 
with death presumably I’d be dead ?), just as it is unclear 
how I, flesh and blood, can be a « new meaning », or new 
at all. In fact, isn’t this talk of oracles’ ability to transform 
people philosophically suspicious ? For it would seem that 
what is being propounded here is a version of social cons-
tructivism (« oracular constrictivism » if you will), based on 
the preposterously idealist notion that entities of the world 
can be brought in and out of existence by mere human 
fancy — divinatory or otherwise.
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Such appeals to common sense are cheap in their 
professed transparency. As Latour has pointed out, from a 
properly anthropological perspective the dilemma between 
realism and idealism is false39. Constructivism is indeed 
preposterous inasmuch as it comes as a remedy for a bias of 
its own premise, namely that « our ideas » and « the world » 
cannot but constitute distinct ontological camps. For only 
on this premise does it even become possible — let alone 
necessary — to say that what « appears » to be real and mind-
independent is actually « only » a human construct.
But all this means is that to understand Ifá divination 
and initiation it is necessary to deny that the distinction 
between concepts (or meanings) and things (or people) is 
axiomatic. Instead of reducing to the absurd our claim that 
oracular pronouncements have ontological effects, appeals 
to common sense just alert us to the fact that the sense of 
divination, with its seemingly bizarre entailment that asser-
tions may be unfalsifiable at the level of logical principle, is 
quite uncommon.
And it is uncommon in just the way Latour has envisa-
ged. For what differentiates predicative (conventional) from 
non-predicative (inventive) definition, and what makes the 
latter rather than the former appropriate to the analysis of 
divination, is precisely that predication presupposes the 
« common » distinction between word and world, while 
invention does not. As we saw, the truth-functional charac-
ter of conventional definitions is premised on the logical 
priority of their definienda. And, as we also saw above, 
although this logical priority does not imply that the defi-
nienda in question exist (e.g. defining unicorns as « horses 
with horns » does not mean that they exist), it does imply 
the existence of a domain of entities — the « world » — from 
which conventional definitions may draw their truth-values. 
By contrast, inventive definitions do not presuppose the 
existence of a world of entities : such a world is their con-
ventionalised outcome. When the oracle of Ifá defines me 
as a person death is after, it is not speaking of an entity (viz 
me) existing out there in the world, of whom certain pro-
perties may be said to hold (viz that death is after me). Such 39 Latour, 1999.
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a construal would imply that the definition in question is 
conventional and open to falsification — a notion babalawos 
are keen to deny. But nor does the inevitable consequence, 
namely that in defining me the oracle is bringing me about 
as a new person, imply the idealist notion that the world’s 
constituents exist insofar as people (such as diviners or 
anthropological analysts) think or speak of them. For, 
just like the notion of conventional definition, idealism is 
premised on a logical distinction between word and world, 
concept and thing, etc. — in other words, precisely that dis-
tinction which the logic of invention obliterates.
It follows that in committing us to a notion of inven-
tion, divination leads us a fortiori to posit an ontological 
parity between what common sense distinguishes as « con-
cepts » and « things ». Thus our analytical imagination is 
further stretched to include a monistically construed plane 
of concepts-cum-things that incorporates elements like 
me, death, impotence, inaugurations, novelties, meanings, 
and horses with horns too. Each of these may be brought 
together with others so as to engender new elements, such 
as me whom death is after, inventive definitions, or even 
fairytales with unicorns in them. Before closing I’ll make 
explicit some important corollaries of positing such a plane 
of concepts-cum-things. But first we may note that the claim 
that divinatory pronouncements redefine neophytes by rela-
ting them internally to data associated with the oddu puts 
us in good position to settle the matter regarding cult rela-
tionships also. This becomes apparent when one considers 
the second point mentioned earlier, namely that it befalls 
the oracle to regulate neophytes’ course through successive 
ceremonies of consecration and initiation.
Divinatory obligation and internal relations
As already mentioned, it is the oracle that determines 
whether a given practitioner « has the path of Ifá » (tiene 
camino de Ifá), i.e. whether he has to become a babalawo. 
The sense of journey that the notion of a « path » conveys 
is reflected along the vertical axis of the matrix of conse-
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cration and initiation presented in table 1. Within this 
matrix of possible ceremonies the oracle’s regulative role 
is pervasive, since every stage of consecration or initiation 
is subject to divinatory confirmation, and cannot proceed 
without it. Hence, under this arrangement, in order to 
become babalawos potential neophytes are required to 
undergo a whole series of divinations, the most crucial 
being the itá séance that is carried out in the ceremony of 
mano de Orula. Whether the neophyte has the path of Ifá 
depends on which of the 256 possible signos he draws in 
this itá. Since only a proportion of combinations indicate 
that Orula is « calling » the neophyte to initiation, as prac-
titioners sometimes say (la llamada de Orula), the matter is 
uncertain. To illustrate how oracles regulate practitioners’ 
initiatory course I quote from a letter written in response to 
my request by my friend Javielito Alfonso, a babalawo in his 
40s from a well-established lineage in Havana :
In relation to my steps of initiation, I can tell you that at a very 
early age I received the Warriors from the hands of Isaias Mejias, 
my father’s godfather. I suppose I must have been 3 or 4 years old, 
I do not remember the moment. At 10 years of age at 1969 I recei-
ved mano de Orula […] Only from that moment onwards did I begin 
to have notions of Ifá, though still in a rather indirect manner […] 
I say this because Ifá was not my interest as such, since at that time 
what really interested me were music groups of rock, pop, and soul 
of the 60s, and furthermore I was aware of the negative attitudes 
regarding the religions at the time40. In my mano de Orula [viz the 
ceremony] I drew the signo ****41 and it was determined that my 
guardian angel is Ogún. To the question whether I have to seat 
the santo [viz undergo the full initiation to Santería], Orula said 
no, so it was determined that I have to wash42 Ogún and become 
Ifá. My disinterest continued until finally I decided to become 
Ifá, influenced by the fascination of the stories [viz the myths], 
listening to the babalawos speak, and seeing that many people with 
less background or none at all were beginning to enter the religion. 
Also, a principal aspect of the signo that I had drawn in my mano 
de Orula is difficulty at advancing in life, or bringing one’s aspira-
tions to fruition. This signo speaks of the crab of whom there is the 
proverb that says that he walks backwards and has no head, so the 
babalawos tell you that you need to become Ifá in order to change 
and to be able to prosper in life, etc. Thus in 1988 I washed Ogún 
and in August of that year I became Ifá. In Ifá I drew **** as my 
principal signo.
40 The Cuban authori-
ties’ tolerance of  the 
cults in a socialist 
context is a relatively 
recent phenomenon 
(see Argüelles & Hodge, 
1991 : 141-171 ; 
Bolívar, 1997 : 165 ; 
Pedraza, 1998 : 24-
30 ; Hagedorn, 2001, 
Holbraad, 2004) 
41 There is no need to 
reveal this personal 
information.
42 « Washing » a deity 
(lavar el santo) is a 
cheap alternative to full 
Santería initiation 
(see table 1).
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The first point to note is the clarity with which Javielito 
lays out the regulative role of the oracle, which dictated his 
course from ceremony to ceremony. The itá of his mano de 
Orula ceremony « determined » that he should wash Ogún 
and then become Ifá, and so he does, notwithstanding his 
initial « disinterest » — which will be addressed presently. 
This suggests an important step towards establishing that 
the relationships that initiation generates are « internal ». 
If, as we have argued, oracular pronouncements are best 
construed as redefining the neophyte, then this must hold 
also for the oracle’s « call to Ifá », as well as all its other 
regulative prescriptions regarding previous and subsequent 
ceremonies. On this view, the oracle’s determination that 
Javielito should wash Ogún and become Ifá redefines him 
as a person by relating him « internally » to these deities, 
just like, by saying that death is after me, the oracle redefi-
ned me as a person by relating me internally to death.
However, this is only a first step towards characteri-
sing the relationships that are generated by the ceremony 
of initiation itself. As Javielito’s delays demonstrate, the 
neophyte-to-deity relationships that oracles establish are 
not identical to those established during initiation. In fact, 
all the oracles can do is to redefine potential neophytes as 
persons who have to receive certain deities. In other words, 
the internal relationships established with the deities in 
itá divination imply only an obligation, projected into the 
future. What needs to be shown is that the internal charac-
ter of these obligations carries over to the relationships that 
consummate them, when neophytes actually receive the 
deities during initiation. If this were to be established, the 
final step of showing that ritual kin relations between ini-
tiates are also internal would be a small one, since logically 
speaking ritual kinship comes part and parcel with receiving 
the deities, as seen in figure 3.
The key to understanding how the internal character 
of relations carries over from divinatory prescriptions to 
initiation lies, I want to argue, in the notion of obligation 
itself, which is the second element that Javielito emphasised 
in his cogent account. Indeed, Javielito’s references to « dif-
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ficulties » and the need to heed the oracle’s call to become 
Ifá in order to bring aspirations to fruition are atypical only 
in their relative mildness. As a matter of fact, the obligation 
to heed the oracle’s prescriptions in all matters, including 
sacrifices and other injunctions and prohibitions as well as 
the all-important matter of initiation, is often a matter of 
considerable anxiety for practitioners. To disregard oracular 
imperatives — or, as practitioners say, to « fall into disobe-
dience » (caer en la desobedencia) — is considered an affront 
to Orula himself. And, as the myths of the oddu continually 
reiterate, the deities’ wrath can be awesome in such cases, 
as indeed can be their favour when the oracle’s strictures 
are followed.
Initiation is particularly problematic in this context. 
With prices currently ranging from $1 000 to more than 
$5 000, Ifá is one of the most expensive of what is in any 
case an inordinately pricey set of ceremonies, so most practi-
tioners have mixed feelings about the prospect of having the 
oracle mark them a path of Ifá43. Notwithstanding its great 
prestige, only a small proportion of potential neophytes can 
actually afford to go through with the ceremony. For most, 
having a path of Ifá implies a long and frustrating period of 
waiting for a financial opportunity to come along, and this 
is by no means an easy matter given the present economic 
outlook in Cuba44. Indeed, the frustration that potential 
neophytes experience for as long as initiation remains 
beyond their financial reach is compounded by an element 
of fear. For it is understood that a pending initiation can 
anger the deities concerned, particularly if the chosen neo-
phyte seems to be ignoring the oracle’s call by procrastina-
ting his initiation, failing to save up, or to take advantage 
of the right circumstances when they come his way. In such 
cases all sorts of incidental misfortunes that might afflict 
the potential neophyte may be explained in terms of his 
failure to heed Orula’s call, and this provides babalawos 
with a certain amount of emotional leverage when it comes 
to impressing the urgency of initiation upon potential god-
children — a theme to which I shall return.
43 Holbraad, 2004.
44 Hagendorn, 2001.
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So obligation, with its emotional sanctions, is the link 
that connects the oracle’s initial call with the ceremony of 
initiation itself. I want to argue that obligation acquires cer-
tain peculiar logical characteristics in the divinatory context 
of Ifá, and that these characteristics explain why obligation 
furnishes, so to speak, a logical bridge across which internal 
relations are carried from divination to initiation. Note that 
such an argument is necessary precisely because, construed 
in an ordinary sense, the notion of obligation would appear 
not to provide such a bridge. On the commonsense view, 
Orula’s « call » would be deemed obligatory, by means 
of the divine sticks and carrots Javielito refers to, just to 
compensate for the absence of any ineluctable logical link 
between what one is told to do (divination) and what one 
actually does (initiation). Divination does not imply initia-
tion, on this view, so it may as well compel it.
Here it is worth making explicit some of the premises 
that underlie this commonsense view of obligation45. For a 
start, obligation is taken as a means of regulating choice : it 
only makes sense to oblige someone to act in a certain way 
(e.g. to get initiated) if he may have acted otherwise. In other 
words, obligation is posited against the background of a set 
of distinct possible courses of action, including the pres-
cribed course and its assumed alternatives. In the case of 
divinatory « calling » the alternative that seems to motivate 
obligation in the first place is a state of inaction, namely 
the fact that potential neophytes have not yet been initiated, 
and this state of affairs may be taken as logically distinct 
from the prescribed action, i.e. initiation itself. Thus the 
common sense take on divinatory obligation implies a 
particular view of temporal distribution, whereby actions 
and/or inactions succeed each other as logically discrete 
units. What unifies these logical snapshots is, of course, the 
fact that they are ascribed to a single agent. So if obligation 
presupposes a series of discrete actions distributed over 
time, it also presupposes a single perduring subject who 
either performs or fails to do so at different times. In other 
words, the commonsense notion of obligation is premised 
on a straightforward Aristotelian analysis of change, based 
45 For a well-rounded 
though technical 
exposition of  the logic 
of  obligation, cf. Horty, 
2001.
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on digital alterations of a subject’s predicates at different 
times. In our case this would be spelled out as follows :
At the time of the oracle’s « call » the person (subject) is not 
initiated (predicate).
At the time of initiation the person (subject) is initiated 
(predicate).
Straightforward as it is, talk of perduring subjects and 
altering predicates should alert us to the fact that this view 
of obligation may be quite inappropriate to the analysis 
of the oracle’s call to initiation. For, as we have seen, Ifá 
divination turns on a logic that precludes subject/predicate 
distinctions. In fact, by inaugurating new meanings, divina-
tory pronouncements turn the logic of Aristotelian change 
inside out or, better, back to front. Rather than imagining 
that definition must start with a subject (definiendum) upon 
which predicates (definiens) may be applied, the inventive 
definitions that oracles effect take the definiens as raw mate-
rial out of which a definiendum may be crafted afresh by a 
process of synthetic combination.
Now, it may be objected that this logical discrepancy 
is irrelevant to the question of divinatory obligation. On 
this view obligation, with its subject-predicate baggage, 
pertains to the product of divination, i.e. the « new person » 
that oracular definition has invented, whereas the reverse 
logic of divination pertains only to the process of invention 
itself, which is both temporally and logically anterior. The 
problem with this suggestion, however, is that is presents 
the oracle’s power to compel as somehow separable from 
the business of divinatory definition, as if obligation were a 
contingent or « extra » feature that may or may not accom-
pany the oracle’s call. This hardly tallies with practitioners’ 
own view, according to which the oracle’s pronouncements 
are taken as obligatory by virtue of being oracular (much like 
they are taken to be true for the same reason). For practitio-
ners of Ifá it would be nonsense to say of a pronouncement 
that it is divinatory and then to wonder ex post facto whether 
it is also obligatory. As we saw, Orula’s word is the kind of 
word that demands obedience, and that’s that.
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It follows that obligation needs to be understood as a 
function of the logic of divination itself, and this requires 
a wholesale departure from subject-predicate assumptions. 
The question is this : what are the logical contours of obli-
gation when it is seen as a corollary of inventive definition ? 
In particular, if subject-predicate assumptions stand in the 
way of properly analysing divinatory obligation, then what 
logical image are we left with if we discard such assump-
tions ? What would obligation look like if it were not parsed 
as a digital alteration of a subject’s predicates ?
As we saw, subject-predicate analyses imply a specific 
image of change itself : a self-identical subject perdures 
through a serial succession of different discrete predicates. 
A crucial point to note here is that this analysis renders 
change as an essentially derivative phenomenon : changes 
are broken down in terms of a temporal succession of puta-
tively more basic logical units, which are not in themselves 
subject to change. On the one hand, the substrate that 
guarantees the unity of the phenomenon of change (viz the 
subject) is posited as a perduring and self-identical entity. 
On the other, the predicates that hold of it do not in them-
selves change either : they succeed each other as discrete 
self-identical states which, as such, can be placed between 
quotation marks, or designated by a single symbol (property 
« U » for uninitiated, « I » for initiated, etc.), just as subjects 
can (« p » for person, etc.).
What if one denied the Aristotelian model by ren-
dering change non-derivative ? What if one took the basic 
logical unit for the analysis of change to be, not unchanging 
and discrete data such as subjects and their predicates, but 
rather changes themselves ? According to such a view the 
problem would not be how to account for the fact that 
things change (to which the logical armoury of subject and 
predicate is one solution), but rather that of showing how 
changes can become things, so to speak. But this problem 
we have already begun to solve in our analysis of inventive 
definition. As we saw, for the idea of « inventive definition » 
to make sense one has to deny the (otherwise) axiomatic 
distinction between a subject and its predicates (e.g. me 
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and death) in favour of a monistic plane of concepts-cum-
things that can be combined with each other to define new 
concepts-cum-things (e.g. me whom death is after). So we 
already have a rudimentary account of how (concepts-cum) 
things come about, and this begs our present question 
nicely : is this account compatible with the analytical 
reversal that divinatory obligation seems to force upon us, 
namely that the basic units that make up things like « me 
whom death is after » (viz I, death, etc.) are changes rather 
than stable entities ?
Figure 4a - « Motile » transformation
« being persecuted 
by death » 
« not being persecuted 
by death » 
Figure 4b - Aristotelian predicative change
The non-predicative or, as I’ll call it, « motile » image 
of change that follows from the inventive logic of divination 
is depicted in figure 4a, and can be contrasted with the 
image of predication in figure 4b. Three features should be 
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4a would indicate, this monistic picture presents myself and 
death (which in 4b are presented as subject and predicate) 
as the same kind of thing, namely as trajectories of change. 
And note that the same goes for the altered trajectory that 
results from their fusion, myself-whom-death-is-after46. A 
second point follows, namely that according to this view 
change occurs seamlessly : rather than a digital disjunction 
of a property and its negation before and after the change 
as in 4b, what we have here is an « analogue » fusion of con-
cepts-cum-things that produces more of the same : another 
concept-cum-thing — viz me-whom-death-is-after47. So the 
novelty that the change produces should here be thought 
of as the kind of novelty transformations bring about, the 
creation that ensues when things differentiate themselves 
by combining with others48. After change, it’s changes all 
the way down, to recast the anthropological saying about 
turtles and analysis49.
From this idea of seamless transformation follows the 
third and, to our purposes, most significant point, which 
has to do with choice. As explained earlier, the idea of 
choice turns on subject-predicate logic, since choices are 
premised on logical distinctions between possible courses 
of action that can be distributed discretely over time50. So 
choice is incongruent with our motile image. Indeed, to 
imagine change as a seamless transformation of further 
changes is to imagine what could be called a hyper-determi-
nist world. If the trajectories that make up a transformation 
are seamlessly connected, and no data other than trajec-
tories influence their course (…change all the way down), 
it follows that their courses could not but be as they are. 
For to imagine an alternative course (as one must if one is 
properly to speak of choosing) is conceptually to interrupt a 
change in order to intercalate its putative alternative. And 
this would be to render the change discrete — effectively, 
to « conventionalise » it as a subject. In other words, each 
transformation of concepts-cum-things is as it is because the 
concepts-cum things that it combines are as they are because 
of yet other concepts-cum-things, and, since this regress 
is infinite, each concept cannot but be as it is. Elsewhere I 
46 The fact that for 
purposes of  this 
minimal example the 
fusion has had to be 
characterised verbally 
in terms of  the relation 
« …is after » should not 
be taken as evidence 
that relations are 
ontologically different 
from the trajectories 
they relate. Rather, the 
verbal characterisation 
is shorthand for the fact 
that many more trajec-
tories are involved in 
the fusion, including the 
one of  the concept-cum-
thing « after » — which, 
of  course, in this 
context is a synonym of  
« persecution ». 
47 Bateson, 2002 : 103.
48 Viveiros de Castro, 
1998 : 15-17.
49 Geertz, 1993 : 28-29.
50 For a classic 
argument on the 
analogy between tempo-
rality and modality 
(i. e. between different 
times and different 
possible worlds) see 
Lewis, 1986 : 202-204 
and passim.
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have called this characteristic of motility « necessity », but 
perhaps « pure actuality » would be more accurate, since 
ordinary philosophical analyses of necessity show that it 
can be imagined from within a predicative frame, whereas 
what we have in mind here cannot51.
These considerations allow us finally to answer the 
question regarding the motile view of obligation. True, 
this view leaves no space for a concept of obligation that is 
bound up with the option of choice. But this is its virtue for 
our purposes. For the notion that having a « path of Ifá » 
marked by the oracle implies that the potential neophyte has 
to undergo the initiation can be rendered in purely motile 
terms. On such an analysis the divinatory verdict that says 
« you have to become Ifá » does not « prescribe » a course of 
action in the face of possible alternatives, but rather descri-
bes (or predicts) a course that cannot but be as it is, since it is 
trajectile. On the oracle’s say-so, becoming Ifá is something 
one « has to » do in the sense of having the ceremony ahead 
of one, as a necessary constitutive element of who one is 
(rather than in the normative sense, where « have to » is 
synonym to « ought to »). Were the term not too loaded, we 
would say that on a motile view what seems like obligation 
is constituted as destiny in the strict sense : what one « has 
to » do is one’s destination, a destination that is given by the 
trajectile concepts-cum-things that oracles bring together so 
as to redefine the people who consult them52.
At this point it should begin to become apparent why 
obligation, in its motile guise, allows us to extend the point 
about internal relations from divination to initiation — the 
crux of the present argument. What originally prevented 
such a step was the idea that the divinatory « calling » to 
initiation and the ceremony of initiation itself are logically 
separate. However, a motile analysis of obligation dissolves 
this logical separation. The temporal lag from « calling » 
to ceremony is rendered a logical feature of initiatory trans-
formation, since, on this view, the constituents that are 
transformed (the neophyte and the deities) are themselves 
transformations that unfold over time. Time, in other 
words, unites divination and initiation as seamlessly con-
51 Holbraad, 2003 : 
65-66.
52 In contrast to well 
discussed cases in West 
African ethnography, 
notions of  « destiny » 
or « fate » did not 
show up as a salient 
part of  cosmology or 
practice in my research 
on Cuban Ifá. Not only 
are references to such 
ideas largely absent in 
babalawos’ discourse, 
but also in Cuban Ifá 
and Santería there is 
no adoration of  orí (the 
head) as such, which 
the Yoruba consider 
the locus of  individual 
destiny (referred to as 
iwa, cf.  Bascom, 1969 : 
71-74 ; Lawal, 1985 ; 
Fortes 1981).
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nected moments on a trajectory, rather than separating 
them as discrete actions. By the same token the logical 
difference between obligation and its consummation is effa-
ced. Here obligation is not an extraneous normative add-
on, over and above the actions that it « modifies », as the 
famous is/ought distinction would have it. It is a function 
of the motility of the action of divination itself : the trans-
formation of transformations that the oracle effects is one 
of « directing », seamlessly, the neophyte towards his initia-
tion, by redefining him as someone who « has to » do it.
So when practitioners speak of the initiatory course 
of Ifá as a « path » (camino) they are being more telling than 
metaphorical : practitioners move from one ceremony to 
the next as paths whose course is set by divinatory stricture. 
The tota simul view of table 1, therefore, which presents prac-
titioners’ initiatory ascent as a sequence of distinct possibi-
lities, is strictly speaking misleading. Defined by the oracles, 
each practitioner’s path (or better, each practitioner-as-path) 
unfolds amidst the available steps of initiation, as a unique, 
continuous and therefore purely actual transformation. 
Mixing a metaphor, we may say that oracles regulate initia-
tion by channelling neophytes’ paths like dams that harness 
a river. And the paths are as they are « obligatorily » in the 
uncommon sense of having their course marked by oracles 
that preclude the possibility of choice itself — the possibility 
of possibility if you like.
It follows that if divination relates people to deities 
internally, then so do the initiation ceremonies in which divi-
natory « calls » are supposed to be, as it were, consummated. 
Obligation subsumes its own consummation as an inevitable 
result inasmuch as the consummation is as motile as the 
obligation. After all, imagine the opposite : say we construed 
initiation in predicative terms. A neophyte’s receiving the dei-
ties would then have to be thought of as the process by which 
he comes to « have » them like a subject « has » properties 
— an apparently tenable position. This would be inconsistent 
with saying that the ceremony (viz the receipt of the conse-
crated deities) was obligated by the oracle’s call. For treating 
the « receipt » in predicative terms amounts to treating the 
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neophyte as a logical subject (i.e. conventionalising him as a 
discrete entity), and this is effectively to sever the motile tra-
jectory of obligation at its most crucial point, namely that of 
consummation. If deities were related to neophytes as predi-
cate to subject then, from a logical point of view, their relation 
would be necessary at most, i.e. the deities would at most be 
what Aristotelians would call « essential » to the neophyte. 
We have seen that oracular obligation requires the stronger 
relation of pure actuality — a relation that bars the possibility 
of possibility, which predicative concepts of necessity and 
essence do not.
Thus, by virtue of its own motility, the model of ora-
cular obligation presented in figure 4a reduplicates itself 
in the initiation ceremony that it precipitates, as seen in 
figure 5. It should be clear that the relations involved here, 
between deities and humans, are indeed internal. In their 
receipt, the deities transform the neophyte as someone who 
« has » them. This logical analysis provides a rigorous sense 
to our earlier ethnographic hints at ontological transforma-
tion, such as the idea that initiation is a regal « rebirth » 
that gives health, development and potency (see above). 
Inasmuch as these characteristics are gained by virtue of 
receiving the deities, they can only be thought of as cha-
racteristics that define the neophyte, and definition is the 
hallmark of internal relation.
Figure 5 - Initiatory transformation in Ifá
By the same token, the logic can be extended to the 
second plane of relationships initiation precipitates, namely 
the networks of ritual kinship associated with cult lineages 
and « ritual families ». As we saw in figure 3, gaining a 
godfather (and with him the whole network of ritual kin 
deity
potential
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relations) is a matter of receiving deities from him. It fol-
lows that ritual kin relations cannot be external. If receiving 
a deity (i.e. becoming initiated) just is to gain a godfather, 
and receiving a deity is an internal relation, then gaining 
a godfather is also an internal relation, constitutive of the 
redefinition that neophytes undergo. To wonder whether 
the kin relation might be external is to wonder whether it 
might be possible to be initiated without the auspices of a 
godfather, and this possibility is barred by the logic of Ifá 
initiation.
Conclusion
In one sense the idea that initiation transforms neo-
phytes by redefining them as different people is rather 
banal, at least inasmuch as it reflects an intuition that may 
seem obvious. And the central distinction used to establish 
this here, namely between external and internal relations, 
is itself hardly novel. Nevertheless, the logical framework 
that has had to be developed to account for these conclu-
sions — with notions like inventive definition, concepts-
cum-things, pure actuality, motile obligation, etc. — shows 
that banal intuitions may sometimes rest on counter-
intuitive assumptions. As discussed in the introduction, 
the counter-intuitive character of these assumptions is a 
function of the bizarreness of the ethnography they claim 
to illuminate — in this case babalawos’ conviction that their 
initiatory « birth » is rendered obligatory by divine « cal-
ling », expressed indubitably through the casting of certain 
consecrated nuts in divination.
By way of conclusion, I want to defend the counter-
intuitive character of our analysis from a strong objection, 
namely that it results from an overly exotic account of Ifá 
initiation. There is sense in this complaint. As set out, 
the whole argument about internal relations depends on 
a detailed elucidation of the « motile » logic of divinatory 
invention. Insofar as initiation ceremonies are indeed 
precipitated by the oracles and the motile obligations they 
induce, this may indeed make sense. But isn’t this an idea-
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lised image of what actually goes on when a practitioner 
decides to undergo initiation ? « Decision » is used advisedly 
here because from the practitioner’s perspective — as 
opposed to that of the oracle, on which we have focused — 
that is exactly what initiation represents. While the oracle 
may present initiation as the inevitable outcome of Orula’s 
« call », practitioners’ anxiety on the matter shows that 
there is more to it than that. The mixed feelings with which 
potential neophytes view the prospect of hugely expensive 
ceremonies indicate that from their point of view the pro-
gression from « calling » to consummation is hardly ineluc-
table. Indeed, if practitioners had no choice in the matter, 
why would babalawos raise the spectre of divine wrath as 
a sanction against « falling into disobedience » ? Fear and 
anxiety, it seems, are methods for keeping potential neo-
phytes on the straight and narrow (« path »), and this would 
indicate that, contrary to our analysis of motile obligation, 
things could have taken a different course.
Furthermore, as we saw, they often do. Notwithstanding 
the obligations divinatory « callings » impose, there are 
plenty of men in Havana who at one time or other were 
told by diviners that they have a path of Ifá but nevertheless 
remain uninitiated, often because they can’t afford to pay 
for the ceremony, or even because they ignored the ora-
cle’s prescription, as Javielito admitted doing for a while. 
Conversely, as I have described elsewhere, in Havana one 
sometimes meets babalawos whose initiation seems to have 
been owed more to personal choice than to divinatory 
obligation53. For example, in the late 1990s, when Ifá was 
enjoying its first period of effervescence following years of 
suppression by the state authorities, some men treated Ifá 
initiation as a life-style choice — an element of their « street 
cred », so to speak, along with owning a motor-bike or 
designer clothes. While they would hardly admit this in 
the presence of more senior babalawos, who would criticise 
such trends as a « lack of respect » (falta de respeto), these 
new initiates were rarely inclined to invest much time in 
learning how to practice as babalawos, so that for many of 53 Holbraad, 2004.
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them initiation hardly marked a transformation at all — let 
alone an ontological one.
Nevertheless, while such trends do form an important 
part of the picture of Ifá practice in Havana, the argument 
of this article is that they illustrate the logic of Ifá only by 
contradicting it. This is ethnographically clear, insofar as 
individuals’ putative « disobediences » and « disrespects » 
are subject to criticism, are expected to attract divine sanc-
tions, and are therefore a source of embarrassment and fear 
for those who commit them. But there is also a principled 
reason for resisting the charge that our analysis relies on 
an overly exotic account of initiation, focusing as it does 
on the logical absolutes of the oracle at the expense of 
practitioners’ more ambivalent perspectives. For note that 
this contrast, between the logic of divinatory obligation and 
people’s capacity to contradict it, is strictly analogous to a 
contrast examined earlier in relation to the oracles’ claim 
to truth. As we saw, the fact that diviners’ truth-claims are 
stipulated as indubitable does not imply that they are never 
actually doubted. Like anthropologists who write on divina-
tion, practitioners too may wonder whether what oracles say 
is « really true ». However, for babalawos who take such pains 
normatively to emphasise that the oracle is unfalsifiable this 
is just a misunderstanding : to doubt whether an oracular 
pronouncement is true is to doubt whether it is an oracular 
pronouncement. The same, I would argue, holds for the 
obligations that the motile logic of the oracles induces. It 
is perfectly possible to view initiation as a matter of choice 
— a discrete possibility of action to be weighed against alter-
natives, or even just ignored. However, such reversals of the 
priority of obligation over choice in Ifá amount to a form 
of logical « denial ». To weigh what one « has » to do against 
possible alternatives is to deny the special sense in which 
one has to do it (as one’s motile destiny), conventionalising 
obligation as a predicative « ought ». Or, putting it in the 
earlier formula, to treat initiation as a matter of choice is 
to treat it as if it were not an initiation. Again, the only way 
to bar this logical avenue is normative : enter notions of 
disobedience, disrespect, and the fear of Orula’s wrath54. 
54 Note that these 
normative sanctions 
are incorporated in 
the logic of  Ifá in an 
entirely circular way, 
since both disobedience 
and the anger of  the 
deities that it provokes 
are diagnosed primarily 
by means of  divinatory 
consultations.
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Indeed, in view of how serious the matter of initiation is to 
the life of the cult, it is hardly surprising that the normative 
stakes, and the emotive responses they induce for practitio-
ners, should rise in such a fashion.
This brings us full circle, to the critical point that moti-
vated the strategy of the present argument. We noted that 
sceptical practitioners who question the oracles’ truth are 
equivalent to anthropologists who wonder why the natives 
« believe in them ». An analogous equivalence, then, would 
bind those anthropologists who seek to explain why natives 
« commit » to initiatory transformation (making it sound 
rather as if the natives commit an error), with practitioners 
who disobediently compare initiation to alternative courses 
of action. Of course, one would hardly want to demand that 
anthropologists obey Orula. Still, babalawos may have a point 
in treating similar instances of disobedience and lack of res-
pect as one big misunderstanding of what initiation is.
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